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A History of Continental Civil Procedure. By Arthur Engelmann and
Others. Translated and Edited by Robert Wyness Millar. With Intro-
ductions by William Searle Holdsworth and Samuel Williston. Boston,
Little, Brown & Co., 1927. pp. lxiii, 948. Vol. 7 of the Continental Legal
History Series.
This is one of the last of the notable Continental Legal History Series
of which eight volumes have already been published. It not only maintains
the very high standards set by the others but it has a special interest of itq
own. It opens to American lawyers and legal scholars an almost unknown
field of study of the utmost value in the administration of the law; and
as an introduction to that study it contains reprints of Professor Millar's
law review articles where in clear, concise and yet complete form he
sets forth the likenesses and differences between our own system of pro-
cedure and the various continental systems. It is perhaps a question
which will prove of more interest to American scholars, the reprint of
material from various continental sources or Professor Millar's own con-
tributions to the study of comparative civil procedure. The reviewer
inclines to favor the latter and he takes this opportunity of expressing
the very great debt which he believes is felt by the profession generally
to be owed to Professor Millar for his devoted scholarship in this all too
unknown field.
The volume begins with an editorial preface by Professor Millar in
which he gives the setting of the subject in the general field of law and
a brief resum6 of the continental -systems of procedure, accompanied by
biographical notes on the continental authors represented in the volume.
Then follow appreciative introductions by Professors Holdsworth and Willis-
ton. Next is a reprint of Professor Millar's articles from the Illinois
Law Review entitled "Formative Principles of Civil Procedure," where
the author made an extensive comparative study of the procedural prin-
ciples of the continental and Anglo-American systems. The general idea
of this comparison may be shown by reference to section 3, "Party-Presen-
tation and Judicial Investigation," section 4, "Party-Prosecution and
Judicial Prosecution," and section 7, "Orality and Documentation." In
these sections Professor Millar indicates perhaps the most notable dif-
ferences between our procedure and that in vogue in continental Europe.
In the latter much more responsibility in pushing a case along to trial
is placed upon the judges than under our practice; so much so that Pro-
fessor Millar refers to our method as "party-prosecution" and the con-
tinental method as "judicial prosecution." In connection with this difference
is' the further one that unlike our written pleadings the policy of fram-
ing issues by oral pleadings at the trial is followed on the continent.
It is true that written claims or notices may be required of the parties
but these are not binding on them and the issues are finally settled be-
fore the court. The net result of the differences is obviously that more
responsibility for the conduct of the case rests upon the judge and that
decisions upon procedural points are comparatively few in number. Any
one viewing the continental system as a whole, and from a distance at
least, would feel that he had arrived at a paradise where the waste
of time of our system upon disputes of mere form is eliminated.
The remainder of the book contains selections from different authors,
giving a history of the various continental procedures from early times
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down to the present. Thus there is considered the Germanic procedure,
the Roman procedure, the Romano-Canonical procedure and the modern
continental procedure of Germany, Austria, France, Italy and Sweden.
Afore than half of the volume is devoted to extracts from the well-known
-at least continentally-master work of Arthur Engelmann, Der Civil-
prozess, Geschichte und System, the selections being taken from volume
two, "Geschichte des Civilprozesses." Engelmann was a judge for
over 30 years, and for the last decade of his life was a member of the
law faculty of the Silesian Frederick Wilhelm University at Breslau. His
scholarly disposition is shown by this work, written, or at least begun,
fairly early in his career. Parts of this subject were brought down to
date by Rudolph Hermann, a much younger man, but a thorough German
scholar, now a judge of the first instance in the same city. The material
from the other sources, though less in bulk, is all from able scholars
in their respective fields and countries. It is notable that some of the
sketches of the present day systems were prepared by Professor Millar
himself. We may congratulate ourselves upon having an American scholar
who is sufficiently familiar with continental sources to perform such a
task. The present volume is intended to be only a general survey and
does not deal with particular cases or problems. It will, however, be
very helpful in pointing the way to much material on such problems.
The picture presented by the whole volume of the principles of civil
procedure from a foreign viewpoint is one which should fascinate every-
one interested in the administration of justice. Professor Holdsworth
does not state the matter too strongly when he says in his introduction
of Professor Millar's own contribution,
"I think that it is no exaggeration to say that this Prolegomena wifl
introduce Anglo-American lawyers to a department of legal thought, of
the existence of which most of them have no conception-a department
which concerns itself with the science of procedure. For the first time
some of the conclusions of this science are e-xplained to them; and, for
the first time, they are applied to our peculiar system of procedure by
a lawyer who is as well acquainted with the continental system of pro-
cedure as with the Anglo-American system."
While there are some striking differences between the continental pro-
cedure and our own, Professor Millar correctly points out that our sys-
tem has gone very far from the heyday of common law pleading in its
approach to the continental forms. It is probable that the presence of
the jury may prevent us from ever completely taking over that system,
but it is interesting to note the many points of similarity that may be
found in the solution of particular problems. Questions of joinder of
parties, for example, brought to the front by modern reforms of pro-
cedure following the English practice, may find their counterpart under
the German code, and it is interesting to note the summary procedure
of countries such as France and Italy for the expeditious settlement of
certain causes, particularly commercial causes, in comparison with efforts
made by pleading reforms in England and in this country to achieve
similar results. In one respect at least we may envy our continental
brethren, for they have gone very far in developing procedure as a science
and a jurisprudence.
It is to be hoped that this book will be only a preliminary volume to
other extensive studies by an increasing number of scholars interested
in the possibilities of work in this field of comparative law. Legal pro-
cedure is but a means to an end, and that the administration of the
substantive rules of law. The machinery which is most effective to achieve
that end should be the one which is to be employed. It is perhaps su-
YALE LAW JOURNAL
prising, in view 6f the number of laboratories we have for experiments
as to the relative efficiency of various types of judicial machinery,
that we have so little scientific study of the effectiveness of each type.
In this country alone, we have some 48 different laboratories in the vari-
ous states, notA to mention the federal and territorial courts, in which
such tests are possible. When to these are added the field opened by
such a work as this the possibilities of research are great. Ono of the
difficulties in the way of developing a better administration of justice has
been the attitude of insularity and chauvinism of the lawyers and judges.
Each fondly believes that the system under which he has grown up is
the best and only possible one, whereas others not so far away may be
much more effective. This attitude of mind as reflected with reference
to reforms in the law of evidence has been strikingly shown by Professor
Morgan and his Commonwealth Committee upon a poll of the bench and
bar of several states.' Continental procedure with its entirely different
approach should prove particularly valuable in giving us a point of view
and a check upon our own methods.
While the average lawyer is not prone enough to accept reforms from
outside, sometimes the reformers themselves too easily assume the perfec-
tion of any system but their own. In this connection we should be on
our guard to be quite sure how the foreign practice operates before we
too strongly advocate it for adoption in place of our own. On the sur-
face the continental systems seem to have eliminated much waste in the
administration of justice. Yet it appears, among other things, that a
very great increase in the number of judges is necessary to administer
them. It is now thought to be a reproach that so many more judges are
needed for the trial courts in New York City than are needed for the ad-
ministration of justice in all of England. But, as the reviewer is in-
formed, in the city of Frankfort alone there are more than double the
judges needed to administer the system than in the much larger city of
New York. The principle of judicial prosecution also may result in some
difficulty, for as the reviewer is also informed, the possibilities for delay
and continuance while the judge is attempting to settle the issue between
the parties are very great, perhaps comparable to our own system in that
respect. It may be that the principle of self interest upon which we rely
to force a case to actual trial may prove to be as effective as the prin-
ciple of official duty relied on in Germany. Other subordinate results are
at least conceivable. Thus, under our system where the palties are com-
pelled to thresh out the issues themselves in advance of trial, it would
seem that they might thereby obtain a better comprehension of their case
before the witnesses are heard and hence that they would be better pre-
pared either to try the case or to effect a compromise thereof. These
and other similar matters can only be discovered by a very careful and
thorough detailed examination of particular procedural points in each coun-
try and also an extensive fact research inter the actual operation of the
procedural rules in each country in comparison with similar research
in our own. It is hoped that means and personnel will be available In
the future for this new type of investigation. In the meantime this present
volume may be hailed as the first and essential beginning of such a
development.
CHrLEs E. CxAnK.
1 MORGAN AND OTHERS, THE LAw OF EVIDENCE-SOME PROPOSALS FOR
ITS REFORM (1927) Appendices A, B, C, D, showing that the great major-
of lawyers answering the questions strongly preferred their local rules.
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Due Process of Law. By Rodney L. Mott. Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Mer-
rill Co., 1926. pp. Lxxxi, 702.
Reviewers have long since discovered that it is easier to review a jacket
or a preface than to review a book. This book had no jacket when it came
to me, but it has a preface. Perhaps a preface, like any other apologia
pro sua, is not to taken too seriously. Yet it may reveal the mould of the
author's mind and it is quite likely to hint at some thesis which a reviewer
may commend or combat. This book apparently has the thesis that the
better way, or at least an essential way, to understand the significance of
due process of law is to try to put salt on the tail of "principles" and to
avoid getting enmeshed in "details." "In fact," says the preface, "so
numerous have the cases on due process become, that it is all too easy to
lose one's self in the forest of details and miss completely the principles
which lie back of the decisions. There seems to be no better way to bring
out these principles than to study their historical development." In such
a perception of principles lies the way of prophesying what the courts
will do next:
"The experience of many a cleve 4 and intelligent lawyer, however, has
shown that either the method of analogy or a temperamental analysis of
the judges is of itself inadequate for this purpose. There remains the
analysis of the fundamental principles which lie deeper than superficial
differences in form or temperament. If there can be found basic principles
so fundamental that the courts tend to recur to them in case after case,
the attorney who recognizes them and advises clients accordingly is cer-
tain to be correct in the great majority of cases. It is the object of this
book to trace the origin and development, as well as the application, of
those principles which the courts have developed as part of the concept of
due process of law."
Pencil marks on the margin of my copy indicate that I have read the first
four parts of the book. These are the ones that deal with historical de-
velopment. I am sure that they have added not a whit to my slender
powers of prophecy. They tell what folks have said about "due process"
and consanguineous terms. Of their accuracy I am not competent to judge.
Of their significance for an understanding of present-day battles of due
process, I am skeptical. The geneology of a slogan may fittingly be the
subject of an investigation, and that investigation its own entirely suffi-
cient excuse for being. I am not such a crude Philistine as to subject his-
torical studies to the test of a cash value. When, however, I am promised
a divining rod, I may indulge in the confession that it has not worked as
such for me.
Publishers, like politics, may make strange bed-fellows, and so they seem
to have done in the case of this book. Parts I-IV are redolent of the
dissertation for the doctorate. Parts V-XI are of a wholly different char-
acter. While I have not read Parts V-IX, I have turned the pages enough
to know what they are like. A seven-page section on what railroads may
be compelled to do with respect to highways and bridges has twenty-nine
lines of text. The rest consists chiefly of citations, with here and there
an introductory sentence of transition to q variation in detail. It takcs
over seventy pages to print the Table of Cases and there are about seventy
cases to a page. This two-thirds of the book that deals with the applica-
tions of due process is in the main built on the model of the familiar law
encyclopaedia. I do not know what to say about a work of this hind
except to pay tribute to the amazing industry of one who produces it,
even though he may have read only a fraction of the five thousand cases
which he cites. As an aid to prophecy, it will tell what courts are likely
to do with respect to issues precisely like those which courts have already
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determined. So does a digest. I doubt if this book will prove a significantly
greater aid to prophecy than the available digests.
A kindlier word may perhaps be said for the effort of the three con-
cluding chapters. These are entitled: "Evidence in Due Process Cases";
"Legislative Determination of Facts and Judicial Technique"; and "The
Function of Due Process of Law." Here are catalogued the canons which
courts have professed to follow in deciding due-process issues and the ox-
pedients of proof and of persuasion which have been employed by counsel
in argument. While the author sometimes seems to take judicial pro-
nouncements too seriously, he allows his readers to discover that the pro-
nouncements have been honored in the breach as well as in the observance.
About many of his own observations there is a convenient vagueness which
makes them difficulV to assess or to controvert. It would be hard to say
just where belief ends and doubt begins when we read that "it is important
to remember that this provision is primarily a guarantee of legality itself,
legality not of the formal or superficial kind, but of the fundamental, in-
herent form which is based upon tested principles of constitutional govern-
ment." The principles of due process are left sufficiently broad to leave
room for play in the joints when they are thus summed up:
"When we find a body of law which is in the main characterized by re-
markable consistency in spite of its close connection with difficult economic
and social problems, when we find a judicial body attempting to develop
that body of law according to recognized norms of constitutional develop-
ment, we are not surprised to discover at the heart of the decisions such
principles as administrative convenience, balance of convenience, or pub-
lic purpose."
Tested by its promise to tell us how to forecast what courts will do in due-
process cases, this study both on its historical and its analytical side must
be called at best but a partial success. To some of us such failure was
foreordained by the characteristics of the material involved. An effort
that confirms us in our faith cannot for us be called a failure.
THOMAS REED POWELL.
Private Corporations. By Henry Winthrop Ballantine. Chicago, Callag-
han & Co., 1927. pp. lxix, 927.
This is the most useful treatise of its size on the law of private
corporations that has yet been published. The volume is unique in the
extent to which legal periodicals are cited, and the selection of such cita-
tions has been wise. Furthermore, the work clearly reflects the important
developments which have occurred in the realm of corporate law in recent
years; with but few exceptions the leading cases marking this growth of
the law are referred to and not infrequently discussed.
The arrangement of the material is quite orthodox; the author suggests
in his preface that it is a "logical unfolding of the subject." Inasmuch
as the book is intended largely for student use, on may venture to sug-
gest that a less "logical" presentation might have pedagogical advantages.
The orthodox and "logical" method apparently begins, as do most case-
books on the subject, with a study of the "nature" or "characteristics"
of a corporation: a consideration of the corporate entity view, of a cor-
poration as distinguished from other forms of business association, and
of a corporation as a "citizen," "person," "resident," etc. This approach
results either in the student disregarding the purpose motivating each
court in applying such labels as "legal entity" or "corporation" to a spe-
cific fact situation, or else in compelling the student to his ultimate con-
fusion to attempt a correlation of a conglomeration of cases merely because
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the opinions employ similar concepts (for diverse purposes) despite the
fact that functionally the cases may have nothing in common.
The second stage in this "logical" unfolding of the subject is to con-
sider the creation or formation of corporations with all the attendant prob-
lems of "de jure" and "de facto" corporations and corporations "by
estoppel." Pursuing this "logical" sequence, the student is next confronted
with the law as to "stock subscriptions" and as to "promoters." Then,
while still reeling, he is sandbagged with "powers of corporations" and
blackjacked with "ultra vires." If not completely ruined, he comes at
last to the "powers of directors" and the "rights of stockholders," and
finally begins to have some glimmering of understanding of the subject.
To the practitioner well versed in the subject this orthodox arrange-
ment of the material may be highly logical, but as a vehicle for bring-
ing the student most readily to a comprehension of corporate problems it
-would seem inadvisable. Rather should the student first be enabled to
understand the normal functioning of an association which all authori-
ties would agree was a corporation (the division of control between share-
holders and directors, the duty of directors to shareholders, the relations
of shareholders among themselves, their relations to corporate creditoro,
etc., etc.). With this picture well in mind the student would be far better
equipped to study the legal consequences of alleged' corporate acts which
are not obviously within the factual authority of the corporation (zo-called
"ultra vires" transactions). And probably last of all he should be in-
troduced to the problems involved in attempts to form corporations, for
surely a knowledge of what he is seeking to accomplish is a pre-requisite
to any intelligent endeavor to form a corporation, just as an insight into
that which is normally comprehended by the term "corporation" is essen-
tial to an understanding of those combinations of facts and legal con-
sequences which it is not feasible to describe by that term.
One of the features of the book is the author's treatment of those
topics which are of comparatively recent, origin or development. His ex-
position of the advantages and dangers of shares of no-par value, for
example, is superb, especially in view of the size and scope of the volume.
Similarly the law as to voting trusts is well stated. Unfortunately, the
presentation of the problems growing out of the Blue Sky legislation is not
quite so'adequate, reference to many recent cases being omitted.'
ALmu Ea HimwLT0 F=.
Cases on the Law of Bankruptcy. By Evans Holbrook and Ralph W. Aig-
ler. Second Edition. Chicago, Callaghan & Co., 1927. pp. xi, 650.
The second edition of this well known case book contains 602 pages of
cases and an appendix setting forth 13 Eliz., the New York statute of
1829, the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and the Bankruptcy Act
(with all of its amendments) followed by an index to the latter act. The
number of cases is the same as that in the first edition and 1920 supple-
1 See: Bates, Trustee v. Firestone, 19 Ohio App. 243 (1924); Burlington
Hotel Co. v. Bell, 192 N. C. 620, 135 S. E. 616 (1926); Dixie Rubber Co.
v. McBee, 148' Tenn. 168, 253 S. W. 353 (1923); Domenigoni v. Imperial
Live Stock Co., 189 Cal. 467, 209 Pac. 36 (1922); Goodyear v. Bleu:-, 143
Tenn. 287, 228 S. W. 57 (1921); Guaranty Mortgage Co. v. Wilcox, 62
Utah 90, 218 Pac. 133 (1923); Hamlin County Livestock Co. N. Karlstad,
48 S. D. 82, 202 N. W. 141 (1925); Hancock v. Frederick Co-op. Mere. Co.,
48 S. D. 1, 201 N. W. 714 (1925); Neimeyer v. Dougan, 31 Ga. App. 99,
119 S. E. 544 (1923); Sherman v. Smith, 185 Iowa 654, 169 N. W. 210
(1918); Snitzler-Werner Co. v. Stein, 234 Ill. App. 392 (1924); Winifred
Farmers' Co. v. Smith, 47 S. D. 498, 199 N. W. 477 (1924); Witt v.
Trustees' Loan Co., 33 Ga. App. 802, 127 S. E. 810 (1925).
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ment thereto. Some fifty odd cases appearing in the latter edition do not
appear in this new edition. More than half of the substituted cases are
cases decided since the date of the first edition. All of those cases in the
1920 supplement are retained except three. The method of arrangement is
identical with that of the first edition. There are still five main divisions,
viz., Jurisdiction, Prerequisites to Adjudication, Administration, Composi-
tions and Discharge. This edition is more compact than the former. The
pages are larger, the quality of the paper seems better and the printing
seems improved. And, finally, more foot notes appear. And occasionally
these footnotes expand into short annotations. So much for general obser-
vations.
A criticism of this edition would be for the most part a criticism of
the first edition. Only a few matters need be mentioned. All of the phases
of "Preferences" presented under "Prerequisites to Adjudication" do not
logically belong there. Sections 57 (g) and 60 (b) obviously have no bear-
ing on "Acts of Bankruptcy." Similarly, Dean v. Davis1 is a decision under
§ 67 (e) and not under § 3. Numerous other examples could be cited.
The answer may be that the arrangement, though not logical, makes the
subject matter more teachable. That obviously was the editors' purpose.
And the answer, supported by more than twelve years' teaching experience,
would seem decisive.
On a matter of greater substance, however, the reviewer would be more
critical. The cases under Fraudulent Conveyances would seem to contain
too many cases representing non-commercial transactions, in number some-
what out of proportion to the importance of that type of transaction in
the average bankruptcy proceeding today. The editors have many prece-
dents for their case. But the reviewer feels that progress has been made
by relegating Reade v. Livingston 2 to a footnote. And, it is felt, further
progress could have been made. This seems more vital when it is realized
what important and significant commercial transactions might have been
profitably introduced or further developed: absolute deeds intended as
mortgages, mortgages under which mortgagors retain possession, floating
charges, assignments of book accounts. These now remain practically un-
touched. Further, the importance of conditional sales and trust receipts
would seem to have warranted giving some treatment to them also, espe-
cially in light of the scope of § 47. As stated in the preface; "If the
selected cases are to the point, inevitably in large measure they are going
to be in a sense illustrative." Nevertheless, the variety of problems raised
by the use of these various security devices would seem to have warranted
a more extensive treatment. Also, the significance of § 67 (d) would
seem to have justified the editors in giving it more consideration than they
have.
One misses landmarks like Carey v. Donahue5 Martin v. Comm ercial
National Bk.,4 Clarke v. Rogers,' Richardson v. Shaw,6 New York County
Bk. v. Massey,7 and a few others. However, they seem to have left no gaps.
And quite often an annotation explains the absence. On the other hand
one welcomes Sexton v. Kessler s Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co.,9 Lewis
v. Roberts,10 etc. They seem to have filled gaps.
1242 U. S. 438, 37 Sup. Ct. 130 (1917).
2 3 Johns. Ch. 481 (N. Y. 1818).
8240 U. S. 430, 36 Sup. Ct. 386 (1916).
4245 U. S. 513, 38 Sup. Ct. 176 (1918).
5228 U. S. 534, 33 Sup. Ct. 587 (1913).
6209 U. S. 365, 28 Sup. Ct. 512 (1908).
7192 U. S. 138, 24 Sup. Ct. 199 (1904).
8 225 U. S. 90, 32 Sup. Ct. 657 (1912).
0 239 U. S. 268, 36 Sup. Ct. 50 (1925).
10 267 U. S. 467, 45 Sup. Ct. 357 (1925).
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The sequence of cases, the choice of cases, the editing of ases,-each is
a job well done. The footnotes, enlarged and made more suggestive, will
be of considerable aid to student and teacher. The important additions to
and changes in the law have been carefully noted. The addition to the
appendix of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act will make the bool
increasingly useful as the adoption of that act continues. By and large
the subject of bankruptcy with its 13 Eliz. background has been covered.
A variety of materials is available to the instructor. In fact, the reviewer
concludes that the availability of this new edition will make the choice of
a case book less of a problem wherever bankruptcy is still taught as a
separate subject.
WILLAI 0. DOUGLAS.
The Law of Aviation. By Rowland W. Fixel. Albany, Matthew Bender &
Co., 1927. pp. xv, 403.
Law of the Air. By Carl Zollman. Milwaukee, The Bruce Publishing Co.,
1927. pp. xvi, 286.
To anyone who is called upon to examine authorities on questions re-
lating to aviation in the course of his practice any book rescuing him from
interminable searches through improperly indexed works is welcome indeed.
In so new a subject as aviation three things are needful.
First: Such actual scattered decisions as exist directly passing on avia-
tion questions proper.
Second: Ready reference to statutes on the subject.
Third: A careful selection of analogies with supporting cases on ques-
tions that are still open and undecided by direct decision or by legislative
act.
The two books by Mr. Fixel and Professor Zollman are complementary
to each other and together meet the requirements suggested, of anyone,
whether student or practitioner, who is interested in the law of aviation.
Mr. Fixel emphasizes the statutory phase of the law of aviation. He has
published not only the Federal Air Act of 1926 with the Air Commerce
Regulations issued pursuant thereto, but he has also printed in full laws
of 27 states that in one form or another relate to aviation. Such a col-
lection, together with the International Convention Regulations of Aerial
Navigation of 1919 covering some 240 pages is in itself a compact and
important book of reference.
The statutes are preceded by the text of some 125 pages in which Mr.
Fixel, writing, as he explains in his foreword, "for the lawyer and the
layman," gives a brief historical legal synopsis of the subject. He discusses
the law of aviation with reference to other branches, such as civil and
military law and admiralty jurisdiction, and refers briefly to the early
discussions of the questions of international law connected with aviation
and their crystalization in the Convention of 1919.
In the sphere of private law he outlines the question of the right of
flight over private property, concluding that this right in practice is so
firmly established as to render the old maxim of ownership of the air spaca
nugatory. He mentions the question of the tort liability of the operators
of aircraft but does not discuss the question as to the liability in case of
injury to passengers, confining his remarks to the damage to perzons on
the ground and the absolute liability therefor suggested by writers and by
the Uniform State Law.
His chapter on the damaging effect of aviation on insurance contracts
shows the unsatisfactory state of the law in this important element in the
proper development of aviation. For the rest he outlines federal legis-
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lation on the subject of aviation with particular reference to the various
branches of the government which have been interested in this field, in-
cluding the Aircraft Board, which went out of existence at the termination
of the war.
Professor Zollman, on the other hand, has taken as the basis of his work
articles published by him in 1919. These articles dwell with scholarly care
upon such questions as the right of a subjacent landowner in the air space,
the proper constitutional theory of federal control, and the various views
as to the liability for damage done by aircraft. The cases cited are care-
fully chosen and admirably illuminate the author's own discussion of the
questions treated.
In case of an airplane accident a practitioner would turn to Mr. Fixel's
work to see whether the particular state in which the accident occurred
had, as has Connecticut, a statutory rule that applies the ordinary rule of
negligence to aircraft cases or not. He would turn to Professor Zollman
for a collection of authorities on the general question of negligence in the
absence of statute.
Neither author emphasizes sufficiently the question as to the measure of
responsibility that is to be placed upon the shoulders of the operator of
aircraft. Both dwell on the propriety of a rule of absolute liability where
damage occurs to a person on the ground. Neither stresses the fact that
the liability to passengers is, with the exception of Connecticut and prob-
ably Massachusetts, a wide open question, the decision of which in particu-
lar states will have great bearing on the development of aircraft, Finally,
while we can agree with both writers that the claim of the landowner to the
airspace to the skies is an outworn formula, we might properly ask for
light as to the correct answer to the converse of thd question, which is,
admitting that the landowner does not own to the skies, does he have any
ownership, aside from the right to complain of nuisance, in any air space
whatever.
CHESTER W. CUTIIELL.
Table Talk of John Selden. Newly Edited for the Selden Society by the
Right Honorable Sir Frederick Pollock. With an Account of Selden
and his Work by Sir Edward Fry. London, Quaritch, 1927. pp. xxv, 200.
This is a most timely and welcome publication. To American lawyers
and to most law teachers, as well, John Selden, the patron saint of the
Selden Society, is no more real a person than is St. George, the patron
saint of Selden's England. But to one who reads the introduction to
this edition of Table Talk, so instinctive with the charm characteristic
of all the writing of the learned and distinguished editor, as well as his
shrewd and half-humorous editorial comment on the text itself, and Sir
Edward Fry's admirable biographical sketch which is included in the
volume, this legendary archetype of seventeenth century learning becomes
a very real person, as thoroughly known as Blackstone or Mansfield.
Selden, to whom Richard Milward, in the letter transmitting the original
manuscript of Table Talk to the dead scholar's executors, referred as
"That Person, who (while he lived) was the Glory of the Nation," is
described by Aubrey as "very tall-I guess six foot high-sharp, oval
face, head not very big, long nose inclining to one side, full popping
eie,"--grey eyes being meant. This description is well borne out by
the two portraits handsomely reproduced in the present volume. White-
lock tells us that "his mind was as great as his learning; he was as hospi-
table and generous as any man; and as good company to those he liked."
One need not read far in the Table Talk to infer that Selden did not
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like dull and ignorant persons. But it is Clarendon who makes clear
the reason for the remarkable fact that this great scholar "of stupendous
learning in all kinds and in all languages" should be best movn, not
for any of the numerous learned treatises which he wrote, but for his
table talk inadequately and inaccurately reduced to writing by his Scere-
tary, Richard Milward, from rough notes taken during the last twenty
years of Selden's life, and first published in 1689, thirty-five years after
his death. So crude was Milward's manuscript, or, at least, the copy of
it that served for the first printed edition of 1689, that Archdeacon Willns
was reluctant to include the "Table Talk" in his edition of Selden's col-
lected works, published in 1726, because, he thought, "it does no credit
to Selden's learning, and is not in accordance with his character." But
Clarendon, with surer understanding, writes "His style in all his writings
seems harsh and sometimes obscure, which is not wholly to be imputed to
the abstruse subjects of which he commonly treated, out of the paths
trod by other men, but to a little undervaluing the beauty of a style, and
too much propensity to the language of antiquity; but in his conversa-
tion he was the most clear discourser, and had the best faculty in making
hard things easy, and presenting them to the understanding of any man
that hath been known." In short, Selden talked better than he wrote.
In his Table Talk, ill reported as it is, "there is more weighty bullion
sense," as Coleridge wrote, "than I ever found in the same number of
pages in any uninspired writer," while Mr. Hubert Paul has said in Titc
Autocrat of the Dinner Table--"Except Bacon's Essays there is hardly
so rich a treasure-house of worldly wisdom in the English language as
Selden's Table Talk."
We owe the publication of the present volume to the fortunate circum-
stance that in 1909 a hitherto unpublished manuscript copy of Milward's
original work came into the possession of The Society of Lincoln's Inn.
The Selden Society is to be congratulated, as indeed are all lawyers who
have come to an appreciation of legal scholarship, upon its success in
enlisting, as editor of the present volume, so acute a scholar and so charm-
ing a writer of English prose as Sir Frederick Pollock.
W. R. VUca.
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